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CASE COMMENT
The Death of a Princess Cases: Television
Programming by State-Owned Public
Broadcasters and Viewers' First
Amendment Rights
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
consolidated and reheard en banc two cases in which state-
owned public television stations cancelled scheduled broadcasts
because of the program's content. After examining the first
amendment issues that arise when the government exercises
editorial discretion in selecting programs, the author concludes
that the Fifth Circuit's opinion does not sufficiently protect
viewers' interests.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Death of a Princess was a television program destined to raise
eyebrows and trigger controversy. It is hardly surprising that
events surrounding the film sparked litigation, multiple appeals,
and a consolidation of two factually similar cases in an en banc
rehearing. The subject matter of the program was volatile: the July
1977 public execution of a Saudi Arabian princess and her com-
moner lover for adultery.1 The Saudi Arabian government added
to the uproar surrounding the film when it ordered the British am-
bassador to its country to return to London after the program was
telecast in England' and temporarily recalled its ambassador to
1. Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n (Muir II1), 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982)
(en banc), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3466 (U.S. Mar. 8, 1983).
2. Barnstone v. University of Houston (Barnstone 1), 514 F. Supp. 670, 674 (S.D. Tex.
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Britain in protest.3
The Alabama Educational Television Commission ("AETC"),
a state agency created to promote and supervise educational televi-
sion,4 scheduled the film5 for broadcast on May 12, 1980. Alabama
residents who feared for the safety of Alabama citizens working in
the Middle East protested6 the scheduled broadcast, and two days
before the scheduled airing, AETC announced its decision not to
broadcast the program. Several individuals who had planned to
watch the program brought suit under the first and fourteenth
amendments8 and 42 U.S.C. § 19839 to compel AETC to broadcast
1980), rev'd, Barnstone II, 660 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1981), af'd on rehearing en banc sub nom.
Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n (Muir i1), 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982) (con-
solidated rehearing), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3466 (U.S. Mar. 8, 1983).
3. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1053 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
4. AETC operates a statewide network of nine noncommercial, educational stations li-
censed by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") under the Communications
Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976). The state statutory provisions related to the
AETC provide, in pertinent part,
The commission is specifically charged with the duty of controlling and supervis-
ing the use of channels reserved by the federal communications commission to
Alabama for noncommercial, educational use. It may designate the location of
stations to utilize such channels and make rules and regulations governing the
operation of such stations and the programs televised over such channels.
ALA. CODE § 16-7-5 (Supp. 1982).
5. The film, one of thirteen in the Public Broadcasting Service ("PBS") series World,
was available to any PBS member, including AETC, that contributed to its funding. The
decision whether to broadcast the program was left to contributing members.
6. "Protest," of course, is a vague term and can include anything from a few postcards
to a well-oiled campaign that generates thousands of telegrams. The Muir and Barnstone(
cases analyzing the Death of a Princess controversy do not describe the kind or amount of
protest.
7. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1036.
8. The first amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The fourteenth amendment, section
1, provides,
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the ju-
risdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. amend. XIV, § 1. The first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press are
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
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the film, and seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions
against "political" programming decisions on the part of AETC.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama denied a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs
had not shown the requisite likelihood of success on the merits.
The court also refused to issue a permanent injunction, holding
that the broadcaster's right to make programming decisions was
protected by the first amendment. The mandatory order was de-
nied because the court held that the plaintiffs had no first amend-
ment right of access to the Alabama educational television network
that would entitle them to compel the airing of the program.10
While the AETC decision to cancel Death of a Princess was
being challenged, a virtually identical scenario was unfolding in
Texas, where the University of Houston was defending its decision
not to broadcast the film against a viewer attack. The University of
Houston funds and operates KUHT-TV, a public television station
licensed to the university by the FCC," and is itself funded and
operated by the State of Texas.12 Unlike the Alabama district
court, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas granted the injunction and ordered the defendant-licensee
to broadcast the film, holding that the university-operated televi-
sion station was a public forum. 8
A Fifth Circuit panel14 affirmed the Alabama federal district
court's decision, while another panel, bound to follow its sister
panel, reversed the Texas federal district court's decision.1" The
Fifth Circuit then granted petitions for rehearing en banc and con-
solidated the cases." On rehearing, in Muir v. Alabama Educa-
tional Television Commission, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that a state-operated public broadcast
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
10. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1035.
11. Id. at 1033.
12. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 111.01-.85 (Vernon 1982).
13. Barnstone I, 514 F. Supp. at 670.
14. Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n (Muir I/), 656 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1981),
aff'g Muir I, No. 80-G-0607-S (N.D. Ala. July 3, 1980), affd on rehearing en banc, Muir III,
688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3466 (U.S. Mar. 8, 1983).
15. Barnstone v. University of Houston (Barnstone I1), 660 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1981),
aff'd on rehearing en banc sub nom. Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n (Muir III),
688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3466 (U.S. Mar. 8, 1983).
16. Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 662 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam).
1982]
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licensee possesses the same statutory rights and obligations to




A. Governmental Editorial Discretion
In the Death of a Princess cases, the Fifth Circuit dealt with
the respective rights of government-funded"8 public television
licensees and their viewers. Government participation in the elec-
tronic media has potential consequences to the rights of both the
broadcaster and the viewing public." In Columbia Broadcasting
System v. Democratic National Committee0 (CBS), a case dealing
with a commercial broadcaster's refusal to sell air time for editorial
advertisements, the Supreme Court of the United States held that
the exercise of editorial discretion in programming was protected
by the first amendment.2 ' The government's role in Muir and
Barnstone raised new questions about the permissible exercise of
editorial discretion. The scope of first amendment protection ap-
plicable to government programming decisions had to be deter-
mined: Are programming choices of state-owned public broadcast
licensees absolutely protected by statute or the first amendment,
or do these choices sometimes constitute government censorship?
The government's involvement in Muir and Barnstone also
presented issues concerning the existence and extent of the pub-
lic's right of access to the public television medium.22 In CBS the
would-be advertiser's right to the broadcast medium was held to
be adequately protected by the fairness doctrine, which imposes on
broadcasters the obligation to devote a reasonable amount of time
to the discussion of controversial public issues and to afford rea-
sonable opportunity for the presentation of opposing viewpoints.23
17. Muir II, 688 F.2d at 1033.
18. AETC is funded through state appropriations, federal matching grants, and public
contributions. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1036. Similarly, KUHT-TV is licensed to the University
of Houston, which is funded by the State of Texas. Id. at 1037.
19. See generally Canby, The First Amendment and the State as Editor: Implications
for Public Broadcasting, 52 Tax. L. Rav. 1123 (1974).
20. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
21. Id. at 121-33.
22. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1041-43.
23. See CBS, 412 U.S. at 100-01; 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976) (codification of the fairness
doctrine); see also infra note 124. See generally Communications Regulation-The Future
of Content Regulation Broadcasting, 69 CAJip. L. REv. 555, 556, 561-65 (1981) (tracing the
evolution of the fairness doctrine).
[Vol. 36:779
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The Court in CBS held that this obligation did not require the
broadcaster to adopt the specific format of the editorial advertise-
ment simply because the proponent of a particular political plat-
form wished to employ that format to air its views.2 4 When the
government acts as broadcaster, however, the public arguably has a
more extensive right of access to the airwaves, based on the anal-
ogy to a "public forum"25 and the presence of state action.
The issues before the Fifth Circuit in Muir and Barnstone
were different than those confronting the Supreme Court in CBS.
Although the plaintiffs asserted a public forum argument, both the
majority and dissenting opinions rejected the theory. 2e In fact, the
court's phrasing of the issue in the introductory section indicates
that the public access/public forum analysis stemming from CBS
was not the issue that divided the judges and prompted the deci-
sion to rehear the case en banc:
The two appeals before this Court on consolidated rehear-
ing raise the important and novel question of whether individual
viewers of public television stations, licensed by the Federal
Communications Commission to state instrumentalities, have a
First Amendment right to compel the licensees to broadcast a
previously scheduled program which the licensees have decided
to cancel.2
7
The factual backgrounds of the two cases are especially signifi-
cant because the purported reasons given for the cancellations
were challenged by the viewers and are, in fact, open to serious
questioning. AETC cancelled the broadcast because of the direct
threat the scheduled telecast allegedly posed to the safety of Ala-
bama citizens in the Middle East.28 The "personal safety" justifica-
tion may appear reasonable at first glance, but it is questionable
whether the safety of Alabama residents living in Saudi Arabia
would be jeopardized by the broadcast of Death of a Princess in
the United States.2 Judge Clark, in his dissent to the Fifth Circuit
24. CBS, 412 U.S. at 110.
25. See generally Comment, Access to State-Owned Communications Media-The
Public Forum Doctrine, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1410 (1979).
26. For a discussion of the public access/public forum issue, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 136-49.
27. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1035.
28. Id. at 1036.
29. Television station officials in both cases cited national security and personal safety
reasons for cancelling the broadcast. For example, the official responsible for cancelling the
film in Houston testified that his major reason for the decision was his concern that the
telecast might "exacerbate the situation" in the Middle East. The district court was not
1982]
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opinion in Muir II, noted that the decision to cancel the controver-
sial film was not based on a reasonable judgment that another pro-
gram would better suit the needs of the audience, or on a belief
that the film was unfair or nonobjective.30 Because the decision
was based solely on content, Judge Clark concluded that Alabama,
in effect, "had supplied a surrogate censor for the Saudi regime."3
Even if AETC's personal safety justification is valid, the rea-
sons for cancellation advanced by KUHT-TV in Barnstone are
suspect and demonstrate the conflicts of interest that arise when a
government entity operates a television station. The identities of
the parties involved in the KUHT-TV decision not to air the film
raise the appearance of impropriety. Acting against the advice of
both the station's general manager and its director of program-
ming, the Vice President for Public Information and University
Relations decided to cancel the scheduled broadcast. It was the
first time in seventeen years of supervising the station's operation
that he had ever decided what was to be televised.32 In a press
release, the vice president cited Saudi Arabia's strong objection to
the film as one of the reasons for cancelling the broadcast during a
time of mounting tension in the Middle East.
The Barnstone I panel, however, found other reasons why the
vice president might have decided to cancel the program. The Uni-
versity of Houston had entered into a lucrative contract with the
Saudi Arabian royal family to instruct a particular princess whom
the vice president believed to be a "distant cousin" of the princess
whose public execution was depicted in the film. 3 Moreover, the
trial court found other plausible explanations for the cancellation
decision: Fifteen to twenty percent of the school's private contribu-
tions come directly from major oil companies and a significant per-
centage of the remaining contributions are received from individu-
als in oil-related companies; the vice president testified that he
considered the program to be "in bad taste"; and there was con-
persuaded by this argument, which paralleled the rationale offered by the AETC officials.
"The showing ... made in regard to the national security exception was unacceptable as a
matter of law. The Court cannot ignore the fact that 'Death of a Princess' was aired in most
of the other 285 public television stations as originally scheduled." Barnstone I, 514 F.
Supp. at 691.
30. Muir II, 656 F.2d at 1027-28 (Clark, J., dissenting). Judge Clark also joined the
dissenters in Muir III. Twenty-three judges participated in the en banc hearing. One judge
took senior status in July 1982 and did not participate in the decision. Of the remaining
twenty-two judges, seven dissented.
31. Id. at 1028 n.5.
32. Barnstone I, 514 F. Supp. at 674.
33. See Barnstone I, 514 F. Supp. at 675; Muir 11, 688 F.2d at 1037 n.5.
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cern that some people might treat the "docu-drama" as a true
documentary. 4
In the minds of the dissenters, the facts of both cases "reveal
dramatic departures from established editorial practice in direct
response to the urgings or implied threats of a foreign
government."36
Any reasoned analysis of the issues framed in the Death of a
Princess cases must recognize that competing interests are at stake
whenever government transcends its traditional role by funding
and operating entities that are usually controlled by private citi-
zens. 6 "Put another way, how may constitutional provisions
designed to control the acts of those operating a government be
applied to the acts of those operating a government sponsored tele-
vision station? ' 's7 The dilemma inherent in permitting the govern-
ment to operate a television station (as opposed to merely provid-
ing financial assistance to public broadcasters for programming
and operating requirements) formed the substantive underpin-
nings for the plaintiffs' argument. Characterizing the conduct of
the government-operated stations' officials as state action," the
plaintiffs argued that the decisions to cancel Death of a Princess
were subject to judicial scrutiny, even though a private commercial
broadcaster taking the same action would have been immune from
any similar inquiry."
When operating a television station, however, the government
(as does any licensee) needs to exercise editorial discretion.40 The
34. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1037 n.5; Barnstone I, 514 F. Supp. at 674-75.
35. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1058 (Johnson, J., dissenting). The dissent's characterization
of the editorial judgments is particularly relevant in light of "the ability of the defendant
usually to offer a colorably permissible reason for its actions." Id. at 1059.
36. See, e.g., Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (govern-
ment operation of a utility); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (state-approved price-
fixing).
37. Muir II, 656 F.2d at 1015.
38. The existence of state action was apparently not disputed. See Barnstone I, 514 F.
Supp. at 672. The effect of the state action, of course, was very much in dispute.
39. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1037, 1043. "The right to the free exercise of progamming
discretion is, for private licensees,. . . constitutionally protected." Id. at 1041. Furthermore,
a private licensee's decision to cancel Death of a Princess would be protected under FCC
regulations, which provide that licensees have the sole right and nondelegable responsibility
to select programming. Id. at 1040.
40. The original Fifth Circuit opinion, in fact, concluded that AETC's refusal to broad-
cast Death of a Princess is "itself constitutionally protected." Muir II, 656 F.2d at 1020.
Compare Barnstone 11, 660 F.2d at 138 (Reavley, J., concurring) (quoting CBS, 412 U.S. at
139 (Stewart, J., concurring)), where this holding is criticized as having "no precedent in
American constitutional jurisprudence. 'The First Amendment protects the press from gov-
ernmental interference; it confers no analogous protection on the Government.'"
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government's programming supervisors and editors enjoy protec-
tion in the exercise of editorial responsibility delegated to them."'
Yet such discretion seems to be directly contrary to the traditional
first amendment doctrine that condemns government control.4
"[T]he First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content .... The essence of this forbidden censor-
ship is content control. '43 Although the first amendment may pro-
tect a government-funded licensee, judicial inquiry into the exer-
cise of the state's editorial power is not foreclosed.4
B. First Amendment Protection
The plaintiffs' state action argument in Muir and Barnstone
was that government-owned stations do not enjoy private broad-
casters' virtually unchecked freedom to determine programming
content. Although the plaintiffs conceded that the state officials
may exercise some editorial discretion, they argued that officials
must be assiduously neutral in deciding which speakers or view-
points to broadcast." Such precautions were not taken in either of
the two cases, the plaintiffs contended, because the officials "cen-
sored" Death of a Princess by deciding to cancel the scheduled
broadcast for an impermissible reason: opposition to the program's
41. The court concluded that state-operated licensees are afforded statutory protection
for programming decisions-but not first amendment protection. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1041.
42. See Canby, supra note 19, at 1125. Although the Muir III court quoted some of the
often-cited maxims of first amendment law that recognize the dangers naturally arising
when a medium is owned by the government, it emphasized that the control was not omi-
nous because-the government was controlling its own medium of expression.
Compare Judge Clark's dissenting opinion in Muir 11:
Besides the possible fear of an outside enemy, our greatest fear-like that of any
people-is that of oppression by our own government. The framework of our
government was designed by our founders to protect us from government.
AETC's casual disdain for our "profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," al-
though no doubt accompanied by sincere motive and infrequent occurrence, is
no less repugnant to the Constitution than a studied design of thought control.
656 F.2d at 1029 (Clark, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
43. Muir Ii, 688 F.2d at 1043 (quoting Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96
(1972)).
44. Canby, supra note 19, at 1148. In a concurring opinion, Judge Rubin clarified the
scope of the holding by explaining that the two cases involve only one program, not a licen-
see practice or policy: "Judicial intervention might be required if these or other licensees
should adopt or follow policies or practices that transgress constitutional rights." Muir III,
688 F.2d at 1053 (Rubin, J., concurring).
45. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1044.
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political content.""
The censorship argument is subject to a classically simple re-
sponse, however. Without delving into the complex relationships
involved when the government funds a public broadcaster, the
most logical answer to the viewers' challenge is that the station was
free not to schedule Death of a Princess. The noncommercial li-
censee could have declined to contribute to the funding of the pro-
gram. Moreover, the licensee was free not to broadcast the pro-
gram even after it agreed to contribute. The suggestion that a
government-owned licensee, which is not required to broadcast a
program, is subject to judicial scrutiny when it does not air the
scheduled offering may seem odd, but it is hardly revolutionary. As
one author specializing in first amendment analysis explained,
once the limited interconnection offering is established and the
station has elected to broadcast a series, it is possible that a
state-operated station should not be able to interrupt the offer-
ing by refusing to broadcast one program of a series [481 or spe-
cific segments of a program. The station would then be engaged
in censorship of the works of program producers who~had other-
wise been delegated the editorial responsibility for creation of
the program content.'
The distinction between not selecting an offering and cancelling
after acquisition is not illusory. In fact, the substantive difference
has been recognized in cases in which school board officials remove
books that the librarian has placed on the shelf.5
46. Id. at 1043. The plaintiffs suggested that the court adopt the evidentiary standard
established in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). The Mt. Healthy
approach places the initial burden on the plaintiffs to demonstrate that unconstitutional
motivations were a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the cancellation decision. If the
plaintiffs meet this burden, then the Mt. Healthy standard requires the defendants to show
that "the decisions would have been the same if the improper factor had not been consid-
ered." Muir II1, 688 F.2d at 1044.
47. AETC and KUHT-TV are members of the Public Broadcasting Service ("PBS"), a
nonprofit corporation distributing public, noncommercial television to its members by satel-
lite. They also belong to the Station Program Cooperative ("SPC"), a PBS-operated funding
mechanism. SPC members are permitted to participate in the selection and funding of na-
tional public television programs distributed by PBS. Each licensee has the option of con-
tributing to the cost of purchasing broadcast rights. Although a member-licensee must con-
tribute or else be precluded from broadcasting, those licensees who do contribute are free
not to broadcast. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1036-37.
48. Death of a Princess was one of thirteen offerings in the World series distributed by
PBS. Id. at 1036.
49. Canby, supra note 19, at 1163 (footnotes omitted); see also Board of Educ. v. Pico,
102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982) (plurality opinion).
50. Justice Brennan explicitly recognized the distinction in Pico, pointing out that the
19821
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Before fully analyzing the case, the Fifth Circuit recognized
that first amendment protection extends to private expression, not
government expression: "The First Amendment protects the press
from governmental interference; it confers no analogous protection
on the Government."' Nevertheless, the court dismissed the argu-
ment, concluding that "it in no way resolves the issue before us."
'52
The lack of first amendment protection for government speech
does not mean that government may not speak, nor does it mean
that individuals may limit government expression. In the absence
of legislative limitation, the court explained, there is nothing to
suggest that government may not speak as freely as citizens.5 3 Al-
though the first amendment is designed to protect private expres-
sion, the court emphasized that "nothing in the guarantee pre-
cludes the government from controlling its own expression or that
of its agents.
'5 4
Because the government is not prevented from expressing it-
self, albeit without first amendment protection, AETC and
KUHT-TV are free to make programming decisions. Under the
Fifth Circuit's analysis, the only constraint is the possible exis-
tence of a constitutional right inhering in the plaintiff-viewers. As
a result, the court's resolution of the competing values did not de-
pend on determining whether the state-operated licensees are
vested with first amendment rights; instead, "[t]he fundamental
question . . . is whether . . . the defendants violated the First
Amendment rights of the plaintiffs" when making the challenged
programming decisions.
55
The conclusion of the full court that the first amendment does
not confer rights on the government when it speaks directly con-
tradicts the holding of the Fifth Circuit panel in Muir II. In fact,
the original panel expressly recognized that "AETC's refusal to
broadcast 'Death of a Princess' is itself constitutionally pro-
tected."56 The court's conclusion regarding the relationship be-
issue presented involved the removal of books, not their acquisition.
51. CBS, 412 U.S. 94, 139 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
52. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1038.
53. "In the absence of a violation of a constitutional right inhering in the plaintiffs,
AETC and the University of Houston are free to make whatever programming decisions
they choose, consistent with statutory and regulatory requirements." Id.; see also Commu-
nity Serv. Broadcasting v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (government may contribute
its own views to the market place of ideas).
54. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1038 (quoting CBS, 412 U.S. at 139 n.7 (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
55. Id.
56. Muir II, 656 F.2d at 1020. One possible explanation for the differing results is that
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tween government speakers and the first amendment parallels its
conclusion in another section of the opinion discussing Congress's
regulatory framework. In outlining the broadcast legislation his-
tory, the court referred to several key cases explaining that the
"scarce resource" 7 rationale is the basis for regulation originally
geared toward allocation of radio frequencies. Moreover, the court
explained that the Communications Act of 193458 was designed to
"promote a balance between the First Amendment interests of the
public and of the broadcast licensees."" In response to the ex-
pressed goal of guaranteeing first amendment protection to broad-
cast licensees, the court explained, the FCC views licensees as hav-
ing the nondelegable responsibility to select programs to be
broadcast.60 The regulations applicable to commercial licensees are
the initial court opinion failed to adequately evaluate the state action factor. For example,
the conclusion that the cancellation is constitutionally protected was prefaced by a reference
to "non-commercial public licensees." Id. A noncommercial public licensee is not necessarily
a state-operated public licensee; this difference may account for the divergent holdings.
57. The scarcity rationale is based on the fact that the broadcast spectrum is limited in
size, necessitating regulated allocation of frequencies to prevent interference. The scarcity
doctrine has always been the subject of criticism and is especially susceptible to attack with
the advent of cable television.
The scarcity rationale was used as the basis for upholding the personal attack rule in
Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 368 (1969). A similar right to reply statute that
applied to newspapers was struck down in Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
Tornillo does not even cite Red Lion or explain the contradiction between the two "right to
reply" cases. Some commentators explain this apparent contradiction on scarcity-type
grounds: Although there are more broadcast stations than newspapers operating in the
United States, the ability to print is only limited by financial entry barriers and the availa-
bility of resources such as paper and ink, while the ability to broadcast is limited by the
scarcity of frequencies.
The recent revolution in cable television growth has made the scarcity doctrine uncon-
vincing. The only scarcity involved in cable systems is the limit on the number of stations
that a cable can carry. See, e.g., Note, The Future of Content Regulation in Broadcasting,
69 CALiF. L. REV. 555, 578 (1981). Furthermore, the scarcity rationale justifies the allocation
of frequencies only to prevent interference, a problem not affecting cable television. Never-
theless, courts still refer to the scarcity doctrine when dealing with broadcasting issues. For
example, the Muir III court explained that "'because the broadcast media utilize a valuable
and limited public resource' they 'pose unique and special problems not present in the
traditional free speech case.'" 688 F.2d at 1043 (quoting CBS, 412 U.S. at 101).
58. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
59. Muir II, 688 F.2d at 1039.
60. Id. at 1040. The court cited Cosmopolitan Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 581 F.2d 917,
921 (D.C. Cir. 1978), for the proposition that "[t]he Commission has always regarded the
maintenance of control over programming as a most fundamental obligation of the licensee."
That case, however, involved the extreme circumstance of a licensee who relinquished virtu-
ally all interest in, and control over, programming to time brokers, religious broadcasters,
and commission salesmen.
AETC once lost its license because, among other reasons, it failed to maintain exclusive
authority over all of its programming decisions. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 50
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generally applicable to public television licensees"1 and the FCC
"has made no distinction between private and public licensees''a2
when demanding licensee control over programming.
Focusing on the specific category of public broadcasters, the
court noted that the legislative history of the Public Broadcasting
Act of 1967' demonstrates that programming responsibility is re-
tained by the local station: "[Ejach station would be required to
make its own decision as to what programs it accepts and broad-
casts and at what time."" While both private and government-op-
erated licensees possess identical rights and duties to make pro-
gramming decisions under the legislative and regulatory
framework, the court held that only private broadcasters-not
state instrumentalities-enjoy first amendment protection."
Nevertheless, the court stated that "[this lack of constitu-
tional protection implies only that government could possibly im-
pose restrictions on these licensees which it could not impose on
private licensees."66 The court did not explain how it arrived at
this assessment, nor did it even cite any authority; it merely stated
its conclusion in unequivocal terms.7 In the same vein, the court
did not proffer any reason for its bold statement that the presence
of state action and the resulting lack of first amendment protection
"does not result in individual viewers gaining any greater right to
influence the programming discretion of the public licensees."
Nor did the court respond to the point that there is nothing in the
Communications Act or FCC regulations that precludes judicial
F.C.C.2d 461 (1975). Nevertheless, it does not follow that AETC (or the University of Hous-
ton) would be violating its obligation to maintain exclusive authority over programming if it
allowed the plaintiffs to persuade it to broadcast the documentary film. The prior violation
should not suggest that a violation would occur in the Death of a Princess cases, because it
was AETC's discriminatory practices against black-oriented programming and a failure to
ascertain the needs of blacks in the audience that were largely responsible for the FCC's
refusal to renew the license. See JONES, EszcmONIc MASS MEDIA 214 n.11 (1977).
61. Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. FCC, 521 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
62. Muir III, 688 F.2d 1040 (citing City of New York Mun. Broadcasting Sys. 56
F.C.C.2d 169 (1975)).
63. 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-399 (1976).
64. S. REP. No. 222, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1772, 1786.
65. Muir 11, 688 F.2d at 1041.
66. Id.
67. The dissent criticized the court's failure to explain its conclusion: "The majority
commits fundamental error when it permits state broadcasters to ride on the coattails of
their private counterparts.... [I]t offers no principled reason" for its conclusion. Muir III,
688 F.2d at 1056 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 1041.
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scrutiny.
Besides the questionable scarce resource doctrine, the elec-
tronic media possess other characteristics that have led to "an un-
usual order of First Amendment values. ' '"e In fact, the Fifth Cir-
cuit recognized that the same type of first amendment analysis
cannot be applied to all methods of expression because "each
method tends to present its own peculiar problems."70 In addition,
the broadcast medium is dynamic and the state of the art is con-
stantly in flux; solutions that were adequate a decade ago are not
necessarily adequate now, and those acceptable today may well be
outmoded in a few years.7 The relationship among producer, licen-
see, and consumer mandates a balanced first amendment analysis
encompassing the realities of the electronic age. Because the pur-
chaser of programming (the licensee) is not the ultimate consumer,
the licensee's programming practices screen out information from
the viewer. This screening, though an exercise of first amendment
rights that falls under the general rubric of editorial discretion,
also works against the first amendment values of both the speaker
(the party who originated the film) 7 ' and the listener. In addition,
any first amendment analysis must weigh the rights of viewers. As
the Red Lion Court stated, "It is the right of the viewers and lis-
teners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.
'72
Thus framed, the Muir III court's analysis focused on compet-
ing first amendment values. The actual formulation of the issue
presented differed among the courts considering the case, and fore-
shadowed the result. For instance, the district court in Barnstone I
phrased the issue as "whether a state, albeit operating in the ca-
pacity of a state owned and operated television station, is somehow
excused from recognizing the protections of the First Amend-
ment.17 4 The Fifth Circuit panel in Muir II made it appear that
the plaintiffs were asserting a constitutional right to view every
program that appears on a preannounced schedule by stating the
69. CBS, 412 U.S. at 101.
70. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1043 (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
503 (1952)).
71. See, e.g., CBS, 412 U.S. at 101.
72. Compare Barnstone 1, 514 F. Supp. at 689 (the "true" speaker is the film maker,
not the licensee) with Muir II, F.2d at 1019 (plaintiffs described as viewers "seeking to force
an unwilling speaker to speak").
73. Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); see also Note, The Lis-
tener's Right to Hear in Broadcasting, 22 STAN. L. Ruv. 863 (1970). For cases involving the
right to receive information, see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), and Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
74. 514 F. Supp. at 691.
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issue as "whether a public television station may cancel an an-
nounced, scheduled program without violating the constitutional
rights of viewers who were expecting to see it."'75 A third formula-
tion of the issue was presented by Judge Reavley in his concur-
rence with the Fifth Circuit panel's decision in Barnstone II. He
stated that the primary inquiry "should be whether the govern-
ment has attempted to silence a message because of its political
content.''76 Finally, the formulation of the issues in the en banc
proceeding strongly suggests the outcome. The majority's approach
toward formulating the issue was to couch the question in rela-
tively neutral terms: "whether in making the programming deci-
sions at issue here, the defendants violated the First Amendment
rights of the plaintiffs."'77 On the other hand, one of the dissenters
viewed the legal issue in more emotional terms: "whether the exec-
utive officers of a state operated public television station may can-
cel a previously scheduled program because it presents a point of
view disagreeable to the religious and political regime of a foreign
country.
' 78
The plaintiffs argued that, because of the presence of state ac-
tion, government-funded noncommercial stations deserve special
treatment. 79 As outlined by the district court in Barnstone I, Con-
gress was aware that "federal funding brought with it the danger of
governmental control"80 and, therefore, authorized creation of the
nonprofit, nongovernmental Corporation for Public Broadcasting
to act as a funding mechanism for noncommercial broadcasting."1
The Corporation established another independent organization to
develop suitable programming, the Public Broadcasting Service."2
The Station Program Cooperative"3 was formed to prevent govern-
75. 656 F.2d at 1018.
76. 660 F.2d at 141 (Reavley, J., concurring).
77. 688 F.2d at 1038.
78. Id. at 1053 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
79. Barnstone 1, 514 F. Supp. at 680-83.
80. Id. at 681-82.
S1. Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, § 201(9), 81 Stat. 365, 368-73
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
82. Barnstone I, 514 F. Supp. at 681-82.
83. Under the Station Program Cooperative, certain programming will be produced
only if individual local stations jointly decide to fund the production. "The aim of this coop-
erative is to reinforce the existing licensee responsibility for programming discretion.
Through this plan the local stations will eventually assume the responsibility for support of
the cooperative and the Corporation [for Public Broadcasting] will concentrate on new pro-
gramming development." Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. FCC, 521 F.2d 288, 292 n.14 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
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mental control of the content of programs on public television sta-
tions."' By relieving the recipient of federal funds, PBS, of control
over programming content, the local broadcast licensees could de-
termine their own programming and thus avoid the real or
imagined threat of government pressure. The solution, however,
was flawed because many local licensees belonging to the Station
Program Cooperative are owned and operated by state and local
governments.8 5
This incongruous situation is not limited to a handful of sta-
tions, such as the ones operated by AETC and the University of
Houston. There are approximately 285 public television stations, of
which 132 are licensed to state or municipal instrumentalities and
seventy-seven are licensed to colleges and universities having gov-
ernment affiliations.8 The Barnstone and Muir cases illustrate the
inability of many public broadcast licensees to be completely inde-
pendent of government control.
8 7
After pointing out the unique aspects of the broadcast media,
the Fifth Circuit conceded that it was "not convinced" that the
state should be subject to traditional restrictions on regulatory ac-
tivity affecting speech when it makes editorial judgments for its
own broadcast stations.88 The first amendment bars content con-
trol by government when the government sponsors and supports
speech-oriented facilities."9 If government-operated broadcasters
were subject to the traditional constitutional analysis, then con-
tent-based cancellations would arguably be improper, even if the
licensee has no duty to schedule a film. For instance, Bazaar v.
Fortune9" involved a controversy between 'students and officials at
84. Barnstone 1, 514 F. Supp. at 682.
85. "IS]ince many public broadcasting stations are themselves governmentally owned
and operated, it is difficult to imagine their achieving constitutional insulation from the
state." Canby, supra note 19, at 1126.
86. Barnstone 1, 514 F. Supp. at 683 (citing statistics from the PBS's amicus curiae
brief).
87. In the Muir cases, the licensee is a state agency. In the Barnstone decisions, the
licensee is the University of Houston, which operates KUHT-TV. The station obtains its
power from the university and is housed in a building maintained by the school and located
on campus. Approximately 50% of the university's operating budget comes directly from
the state's general revenue funds. Public funds from the Association for Community Televi-
sion account for approximately 60% of the station's annual budget. Barnstone I, 514 F.
Supp. at 672.
88. Muir 111, 688 F.2d at 1043.
89. Id.
90. 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir.), affd as modified on rehearing en banc, 489 F.2d 225 (5th
Cir. 1973) (university allowed to place or stamp on the cover of a literary magazine the
disclaimer "[t]his is not an official publication of the university," though not allowed to ban
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a state university concerning the content of a particular issue of a
student publication. The magazine was staffed and run by students
and was university-chartered and recognized. The university re-
fused to allow distribution of the publication because of two stories
concerning interracial love and black pride. The university also as-
serted that the words used were tasteless and inappropriate. In af-
firming the lower court order preventing school officials from inter-
fering with the distribution, the court explained that "once a
University recognizes a student activity which has elements of free
expression, it can act to censor that expression only if it acts con-
sistent [sic] with First Amendment constitutional guarantees."91
Similarly, Brooks v. Auburn University"2 could support the ar-
gument that the government abridges first amendment rights when
it reverses a decision to broadcast a film it could have declined to
schedule in the first place. In Brooks a student organization re-
quested approval from a university-funded, student-faculty board
to have Reverend William Sloan Coffin speak at the state univer-
sity. The board approved the request. The university president ve-
toed the invitation, citing Reverend Coffin's record as a convicted
felon and a fear that he might advocate breaking the law. These
reasons had never before been used to bar a speaker at the school.
As in the Muir and Barnstone cases, where the licensees were not
required to schedule the film, the court concluded that the school
was under no obligation to bring the speaker to the ultimate con-
sumers. The president's veto, however, was deemed a prior re-
straint and the trial court's decree requiring that the Reverend be
permitted to speak and be paid the agreed honorarium and travel
expenses was affirmed.98
C. Censorship
By stating it was "not convinced" that the traditional pro-
publication or distribution), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974).
91. Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d at 574. The Muir III appellants contended that Bazaar
v. Fortune presented analogous facts. The court cited the case in a footnote, impliedly dis-
tinguishing it on the grounds that it does not suggest that the government may not exercise
control over its own expression. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1043-44.
92. 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969).
93. Id. at 1175. The Muir III court also cited Brooks in a footnote, 688 F.2d at 1043
n.27, but apparently did not find it persuasive, presumably because it did not relate to the
precise factual scenario: government exercising editorial discretion over its own medium of
expression. "There is a clear distinction between a state's exercise of editorial discretion
over its own expression, and a state's prohibition or suppression of the speech of another."
Id. at 1047.
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scriptions on government regulation of speech were completely
controlling, the Muir III court implicitly places great trust in edi-
tors employed by a government-owned licensee. In fact, the court
does not discuss the dangers inherent in a government-operated
television station; the opportunity for censorship is never expressly
acknowledged.9
In contrast, the Barnstone I district court openly recognized
the menace of government censorship. Its analysis was premised on
the belief that the potential for abuse is sufficient justification for
differing treatment. That court set forth its fears in graphic terms:
The possibility of government content control from above has
appeared so ominous that the possibility of government content
control from below has been entirely overlooked. This case is a
direct result of that oversight. In effect, with state and local
governments firmly entrenched as gatekeepers to the public's ac-
cess to information, the fox has been asked to guard the
henhouse.9
The decision to cancel a scheduled broadcast, the Fifth Circuit
concluded, is a programming decision "no less editorial in nature
than an initial decision to schedule the program." ' The unavoida-
ble need for editors to make programming decisions inevitably
means that state officials exercising editorial discretion will make
choices characterized as "politically motivated. ' 'e9 The licensee
must reject some programs in favor of others. Moreover, all broad-
cast licensees are required to provide news and public affairs pro-
grams dealing with the community's political, social, and economic
concerns. 8 As a result, broadcast licensees (whether private, pub-
lic, or state-operated) routinely and inherently make subjective
value judgments about their programming's responsiveness to the
community's needs. Referring to an often-quoted statement from
the Supreme Court's CBS opinion, the Fifth Circuit emphasized
that "for better or worse, editing is what editors are for; and edit-
ing is selection and choice of material.""
Allowing courts to review programming decisions would create
94. Even the initial Fifth Circuit panel, which also rejected the viewers' constitutional
attack, recognized that the situation "may be cause for concern, for vigilance with vigor, for
seeking of safeguards" before concluding that the possibility and opportunity for censorship
is not itself censorship. Muir II, 656 F.2d at 1019.
95. 514 F. Supp. at 683.
96. Muir Il, 688 F.2d at 1045.
97. Id. at 1044.
98. See Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, 39 Fed. Reg. 26,371 (1974).
99. Muir II, 688 F.2d at 1044 (quoting CBS, 412 U.S. at 124).
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practical problems. No programming decision pleases everyone.
The parade of horribles resulting from a refusal to grant discretion
to government-owned broadcast licensees is not difficult to imag-
ine. Licensees could conceivably become swamped with challenges
to their programming decisions. The expense of defending the legal
challenges could be the death-blow to government-owned televi-
sion stations. Broadcast editors who recognize that their program-
ming judgments are susceptible to challenge might try to avoid de-
fending such attacks by opting for noncontroversial formats. 00 As
the Muir III court succinctly explained, "A general proscription
against political programming decisions would clearly be contrary
to the licensee's statutory obligations, and would render virtually
every programming decision subject to judicial challenge."10'
Furthermore, granting the plaintiffs' demand for an order
compelling the broadcast of Death of a Princess might be an unde-
sirable foray into extensive judicial intervention. Granting relief
here would necessarily incorporate the flip side of the constitu-
tional coin: If one person could compel the broadcast of a program,
"another person could use the courts to enjoin the broadcast of
that program solely because that person considered it objectiona-
ble." 0 Still others could seek damages for the showing of pro-
grams to which they objected. Such a demand was made, in fact,
although the court did not refer to it. In Fahd Al Talal v. Fan-
ning,10 the plaintiffs, claiming that they represented "a class of
'nearly one billion persons,' "104 sought damages of $20 billion be-
cause of the national television broadcast of Death of a Princess.
They alleged that the film was insulting and defamed the Islamic
religion. The court dismissed the complaint, but the case illus-
trates the potential for abuse in permitting viewers to challenge
100. The tendency for speakers to engage in self-censorship has been a significant fac-
tor in constitutional analysis in other settings. For example, in the defamation area, the
constitutional privilege requiring public officials and public figures to prove that the defen-
dant acted with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth is based on the fear
that self-censorship would occur without protection. "[W]ould-be critics of official conduct
may be deterred from voicing their criticism . . . . They tend to make only statements
which 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone.'" New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279 (1964).
101. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1044. The description of the consequences is similar to the
initial Fifth Circuit panel's analysis: "If initial rejection of some programs were considered a
form of constitutionally forbidden censorship, every public television station would violate
the Constitution with virtually every choice it made." Muir II, 656 F.2d at 1017.
102. Muir II, 656 F.2d at 1024.
103. 506 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
104. Id.
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editorial discretion. In effect, courts would be converted into
super-editors. Granting courts the power to look over the shoulders
of editors employed by government-operated television stations
would present obvious problems. "Courts are not equipped,
staffed, or trained to meet the public interest by choosing among
the programming interests to be served."' 5
The fear that judicial scrutiny of programming decisions will
lead to continual interference with editorial discretion is a legiti-
mate concern.'0 Nevertheless, the plaintiffs' challenge is not frivo-
lous; the Fifth Circuit's decision to rehear Muir and Barnstone en
banc is evidence enough of the legitimacy of the viewers' claim. In
addition, it should be stressed that the challenge was not directed
at the licensee's general programming scheme or at a failure to ini-
tially select any program for broadcast. Instead, the plaintiffs'
claim focused on a narrower issue: the allegation that a scheduled
program was cancelled for content-oriented reasons.' 0 7 But even if
a court assumes that government-owned or operated broadcast
licensees are susceptible to constitutionally based claims for con-
tent-based cancellations, the complaining viewers still face a legal
paradox: If the licensee has no duty to schedule a film, how can a
subsequent election not to broadcast be constitutionally improper?
Although the prior Fifth Circuit panel in Muir II explained the
apparent anomaly by branding the initial scheduling decision a
"different animal from a subsequent decision to cancel"106 when
the decision is tinged with an element of official censorship, the
Fifth Circuit en banc rejected attempts to distinguish the two
types of editorial decisions. To do this, however, the court also had
to reject the many recent federal cases involving challenges to the
105. Muir II, 656 F.2d at 1024.
106. See generally CBS, 412 U.S. at 116-26; B. SCHMirr, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS V.
PUBLIc AccEss (1976); Canby, supra note 19, at 1134.
107. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1043. Just as the majority pointed out the flaws in the plain-
tiffs' argument by carrying it to its logical extreme, i.e., every programming decision could
be the target of a first amendment-based attack, taking the licensees' argument to its logical
extreme produces equally adverse results:
[Tihe answer to the question of state action is no different in this case than it
would be if the licensee were alleged to have engaged in a systematic censorship
of all views aired under its auspices that were, for instance, contrary to those of
the political party of a controlling majority of the members of the Commission.
If such were the allegations here, the plaintiffs would not have to wait idly by
while the FCC, in a lengthy hearing procedure, decided whether such conduct
was consistent with a public broadcaster's obligations. Section 1983 would reach
the actions of these persons acting under color of state law. It does so here.
Muir 11, 656 F.2d at 1027 (Clark, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
108. Id. at 1028.
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removal of books from public school libraries.109
As legal support for distinguishing the two types of editorial
judgments, the plaintiffs cited recent cases holding that school offi-
cials are subject to a first amendment claim if books are excluded
in order to suppress an ideological or religious viewpoint with
which officials disagree. In fact, the Supreme Court handed down a
public library book-removal case 110 while the Fifth Circuit was re-
hearing Muir and Barnstone en banc. In Board of Education v.
Pico, "' a plurality opinion, three members of the school board
had attended an out-of-town conference, where they obtained a
"crudely typed and reproduced""' 2 list of books containing suppos-
edly objectionable material-that was "improper fare for school stu-
dents.""1 Acting against the advice of the superintendent of
schools and a book committee appointed by the school board,""
the board removed several books' 5 from the district's school li-
braries. Students filed an action challenging the board's decision as
a violation of their first amendment rights. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district
court's order granting summary judgment for the school board.
Whether the exclusion of the books was based on a substantial and
reasonable governmental interest was, according to the court, a
material factual issue precluding summary judgment."'
109. See generally Pratt v. Independent School Dist., 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982)
(summarizing recent cases involving elimination of books and films from public school
libraries).
110. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982) (plurality opinion).
111. 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
112. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 638 F.2d 404, 407 (2d Cir. 1980), afj'd, 102 S. Ct. 2799
(1982).
113. 102 S. Ct. at 2802. The school board and the individual board members who were
sued "concede that the books are not obscene." Id. at 2802 n.2.
114. The superintendent posited that it was wrong for the board-or any other single
group-to remove books without "prolonged prior consideration" of the views of the parents
and teachers. In addition, he stated during a public meeting that it was wrong to judge a
book on the basis of brief excerpts and to take action based on a list prepared by someone
outside the community. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 638 F.2d at 410. The "Book Review Com-
mittee," composed of four parents and four members of the school's staff, recommended
that five of the listed books be retained. The board substantially rejected the report but
gave no reasons for its refusal to follow the committee's recommendation. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at
2803.
115. The books at issue were: BEST SHORT STORIES By NEGRO WRITERS (L. Hughes ed.
1967); A. CHILDRESS, A HERO AIN'T NOTHING BUT A SANDWICH (1973); E. CLEAVER, SOUL ON
ICE (1978); 0. LAFARGE, LAUGHING Boy (1929); B. MALAMUD, THE FIXER (1966); A READER
FOR WRITERS (J. Archer ed. 1971); P. THOMAS, DOWN THESE MEAN STREETS (1967); K. VON-
NEGUT, JR., SLAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE (1971); R. WRIGHT, BLACK Boy (1945); ANONYMOUS, Go
ASK ALICE (1971).
116. 638 F.2d at 407; cf. Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25,
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Justice Brennan's plurality opinion recognized the substantial
discretion afforded school officials in determining curricula. Never-
theless, the Court affirmed the Second Circuit, explaining that the
"First Amendment rights of students may be directly and sharply
implicated by the removal of books from the shelves of a school
library."' 17 School officials must determine the content of their li-
braries, the Court stated, but they may not exercise that discretion
in a narrowly partisan or political manner. The motive behind a
decision to remove books determines whether a student's first
amendment rights are denied. If the school board intends to deny
students access to ideas, its decision is an impermissible use of dis-
cretion. Significantly, Justice Brennan distinguished between the
acquisition and the removal of books. 1 8 While the school board
did not have to purchase books in the first instance, it was subject
to constitutional attack for removing the books after purchase.
Despite the similarities between the book removal cases and
the Death of a Princess cases, the Fifth Circuit stated that it was
"unable to interpret the Court's opinion in Pico to give us gui-
dance in the application of the First Amendment to the case at
hand."" 9 The Muir III court's conclusion that Pico did not control
the Death of a Princess cases was based on both prudential and
substantive grounds. On the prudential aspect, the court deter-
mined that Pico "is of no precedential value"1' 0 as to the first
amendment's application to the issues before it because Justice
Brennan's plurality opinion was joined by only two other Justices
and the four dissenters detected no constitutional difference be-
tween the removal of a book and a failure to acquire it.
12
1
The differences between school libraries and television sta-
457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972) (removal of book containing vulgar language and explicit sexual
allusions does not in itself violate first amendment), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972). The
defendant school board in Pico relied on this case.
117. 102 S. Ct. at 2807-08.
118. Justice Brennan made the distinction clear by mentioning it several times in his
plurality opinion:
[N]othing in our decision today affects in any way the discretion of a local school
board to choose books to add to the libraries of their schools. Because we are
concerned in this case with the suppression of ideas, our holding today affects
only the discretion to remove books.
Id. at 2810 (emphasis in original).
119. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1045 n.30.
120. Id.
121. Id. The Muir III court declared that it followed the rule that, in no-clear-majority
cases, it should look to the "position taken by those members who concurred in the judg-
ment on the narrowest grounds." Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15
(1976)).
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tions, the Muir III court explained, are substantial and, therefore,
sufficient to warrant differing analyses. The first contrast men-
tioned by the court involves the nature of the medium: Maintain-
ing a volume on a library shelf does not preempt another volume
(absent space limitations), whereas broadcast licensees are con-
stantly required to make sensitive choices because there are only a
limited number of broadcast hours in a day. And yet the court did
not explain why the physical distinction between libraries and tele-
vision stations does not justify constriction of editorial discretion
for government broadcasters. Indeed, it is the scarcity doctrine
that has been used to justify a more limited scope of first amend-
ment protection for broadcasters. For example, a "right to reply"
rule in the form of the FCC's "personal attack" doctrine was
deemed constitutionally proper when asserted against a broad-
caster. 122 On the other hand, a Florida "right to reply" statute ap-
plicable to newspapers (which, like libraries, do not have the same
type of physical limitations as broadcasters) was struck down as
unconstitutional.1
2 3
As pointed out by the Muir III court, there is no counterpart
to the fairness doctrine 2 applicable to libraries. As a result, the
Fifth Circuit explained, the editorial discretion of broadcasters is
often limited by the requirement that equal time be allotted to an
opposing viewpoint. A library, of course, faces no such constraint;
it is not required to select books espousing differing viewpoints. 12
Although the fairness doctrine may be significant enough to make
the library cases inapplicable to state-owned public broadcast
licensees, the Fifth Circuit did not even mention that the doctrine
is in disfavor and may well be abolished. The chairman of the
FCC, in fact, describes the rule as the "censorship doctrine" and
has designated the abolishment of content-oriented regulation as
122. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1968).
123. Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
124. [T]e doctrine imposes two affirmative responsibilities on the broadcaster:
Coverage of issues of public importance must be adequate and must fairly reflect
differing viewpoints. In fulfilling the Fairness Doctrine obligations, the broad-
caster must provide free time for the presentation of opposing views if a paid
sponsor is unavailable and must initiate programming on public issues if no one
else seeks to do so.
CBS, 412 U.S. at 111 (citations omitted).
Although a controversy arose over the broadcast of Death of a Princess, the program
itself does not appear to deal with a controversy within the meaning of the fairness doctrine.
Muir II1, 688 F.2d at 1057 n.3 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
125. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1046.
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his top priority. 2
The court also stated that the right to cancel a scheduled pro-
gram is "far more integral a part of the operation of a television
station than the decision to remove a book from a school li-
brary." '27 Because libraries usually have the opportunity to review
a book before making it available to students, there are few legiti-
mate reasons why a book should be removed from a library, other
than pure space limitations. On the other hand, broadcasters fre-
quently do not have an opportunity to review their programming
before the station's schedule has been printed.
Having stressed several factors that subject libraries to consti-
tutional standards different from those applied to television sta-
tions, "'28 the court concluded that the decision to cancel Death of a
Princess was not censorship. 29 The court emphasized the distinc-
tion between prohibiting or suppressing the speech of another and
controlling one's own expression. In pointing out the contrast, the
Fifth Circuit explained the conduct of the licensees in relatively
innocuous terms: "[They] have simply exercised their statutorily
mandated discretion and decided not to show a particular program
at a particular time."' 30 Stated differently, the viewers have no
constitutional right to compel the broadcast of Death of a Prin-
cess. In positing such an absolute rule, however, the Fifth Circuit's
opinion failed to create a legal safety valve for extreme situations.
For example, what would be the court's approach if a licensee con-
tinu'ally cancelled or failed to schedule programs advocating the
use of solar energy as a substitute for oil?
To be sure; a licensee engaging in blatantly slanted program-
ming practices would be subject to FCC review and sanctions.' In
126. FCC Chairman Mark S. Fowler has repeatedly said that the agency should relin-
quish control over the content of broadcast programming and assume its proper role as a
"technical traffic cop." See L.A. Daily J., Jan. 18, 1982, at 3, col. 4.
127. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1046.
128. Judge Reavley found the factual differences between Pico and the Death of a
Princess cases to make a stronger argument for subjecting the stations' cancellation deci-
sions to judicial scrutiny. Id. at 1060 n.7 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
129. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1046.
130. Id. at 1047. Moreover, the court pointed out that plaintiff Barnstone viewed the
Death of a Princess program at an exhibition at Rice University in Houston. The court's
mild-mannered conclusion starkly contrasts with Judge Johnson's dissent, which was joined
by four other dissenters. Judge Johnson stated that the majority opinion "flies completely in
the face of the First Amendment and our tradition of vigilance against governmental censor-
ship of political and religious expression." Id. at 1053 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
131. FCC remedial action includes the following sanctions: admonishment, imposition
of a forfeiture, a declaration of noncompliance with FCC policies, issuance of a "short-term"
renewal, designation of license renewal application for full evidentiary hearing, and denial of
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fact, the Fifth Circuit took pains to point out the viewers' right to
a hearing before the FCC to challenge the decision to cancel. Al-
though the court cited a string of cases132 demonstrating that the
FCC does review programming complaints, it did not mention that
"the FCC steadfastly refuses to depart from its 'longstanding pol-
icy of deferring to licensee discretion.' "I's The consequences of the
FCC's policy of deference are hardly surprising: Complaints re-
garding individual cancellation decisions are regularly denied.
134
On a practical level, the opportunity to seek relief through the
FCC might be characterized as amounting "to nothing more than
'.. a promise to the ear. .' which will most certainly be broken
'to the hope.' """
D. Public Television as a Public Forum
The Muir III court also rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that
KUHT-TV and AETC are public forums prohibited from making
content-based programming decisions. 36 The Barnstone district
court, on the other hand, had found that the state-operated public
television station was a public forum because the government oper-
ated it for public communication of public issues. The plaintiffs'
argument on this issue may have been off-target because they were
not seeking access to air their own views. In addition, the public
forum argument, though successful in the Texas federal district
court, faced an uphill battle because there is a basic difference be-
tween the right to hear and the right to have access to the media.
"Unlike the right of access, which is an extension of freedom of




Public forum analysis is based on the principle that the first
amendment grants a right of access to certain public facilities. The
doctrine stems from cases in which state and local governments
license renewal. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1047-48.
132. The court cited 23 cases involving challenges of licensee programming. Id. at 1047-
48 n.35.
133. Id. at 1056 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (quoting Right to Life, Inc. v. WAVE-TV, 59
F.C.C.2d 1103 (1976)).
134. Muir I1, 688 F.2d at 1057 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Moreover, even when the li-
censee was alleged to be systematically censoring all views contrary to its own, viewers chal-
lenging programming formats would not obtain relief until the FCC conducted a lengthy
hearing procedure. Muir H, 656 F.2d at 1027 (Clark, J., dissenting).
135. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1057 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (quoting Cuthbert v. United
States, 278 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1960)).
136. Muir III, 688 F.2d at 1041-43.
137. Note, The Listener's Right to Hear in Broadcasting, 22 STAN. L. REV. 863, 867
(1970).
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have attempted to stifle expression on government-owned property
geared for communication. 13 8 Public forums require nondiscrimina-
tory access; "[o]nce a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking
by some groups, government may not prohibit others from assem-
bling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. ' 139
The fact that government "owns" or financially supports prop-
erty does not alone create a public forum.140 The crucial query is
whether the facility is an appropriate place for the exercise of first
amendment rights.11 The nature of the forum and the conflicting
interests involved are important factors in evaluating the degree of
first amendment protection afforded to particular speech. 42 The
court in Muir III relied on the conclusion in CBS14 3 that a right of
public access is inconsistent with the broadcasters' responsibilities
to serve the public interest.1
4 4
When discussing access to broadcast media, CBS appears to
be an obligatory reference point, as it holds that would-be editorial
advertisers have no constitutional or statutory right of access to
television. " Despite its importance,4 CBS does not control the
issues raised by the Muir and Barnstone cases. First, CBS involves
a private broadcaster; it is the presence of government operation
that underlies the analysis in Muir III. Second, CBS concerns a
demand to use the broadcast facilities to transmit a message-no
such demand is involved in the Death of a Princess cases. Third,
CBS produced six opinions; while a majority of the Court agreed
that the refusal to accept editorial advertisements did not violate
138. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (selective authorization of
picketing near schools); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (peaceful protest at public
library); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (distribution of handbills on the street);
Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.) (leaflet distribution at bus terminal), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968). See generally Cass, First Amendment Access to Government
Facilities, 65 VA. L. REV. 1287 (1979); Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
565 (1980); Comment, Access to State-Owned Communications Media-The Public Forum
Doctrine, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1410 (1979).
139. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
140. See United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114
(1981) (mailboxes not public forums); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298
(1974) (advertising space on city's mass transit system not a public forum).
141. Muir II, 656 F.2d at 1022; Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of West Palm
Beach, 457 F.2d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1972).
142. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974).
143. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
144. 688 F.2d at 1042-43. But see Comment, supra note 138.
145. 412 U.S. at 122-32.
146. "The most elaborate discussion of First Amendment rights as applied to television
is found in CBS v. Democratic National Committee." Muir 11, 656 F.2d at 1026 (Clark, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
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the first amendment, there was no majority on the state action is-
sue. Finally, the opinions are rambling and therefore susceptible to
differing interpretations, all of which may be reasonable. Both
sides in Muir quoted segments from one or more of the six opin-
ions. As the Muir II court explained, "the quoted segments, stand-
ing alone, appear to support the position of the quoting party.
1 47
Although the plaintiffs were not seeking public access, they con-
tended that the two stations were public forums. The plaintiffs
were undone by their own argument, because "[iut is the right of
public access which is the essential characteristic of a public fo-
rum. 1 48 By definition, a facility is not a public forum if speakers
do not have a right of access to it. The court branded as "untena-
ble" " the argument that stations are public forums without public
access.
III. CONCLUSION
Although the viewers were not asserting the right to put every-
thing they demand on the air, a decision affirming the injunction
in Barnstone II could have swamped state-operated broadcasters
with demands for particular shows and complaints about cancella-
tions. Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit in Muir III handed down a
virtually unequivocal rule that may not resolve adequately the con-
flicting interests. The courts may not be the most appropriate fo-
rum in which to air grievances about broadcast programming, but
the courts were, in fact, used as the arena in which to balance the
viewers' interests against those of the program producer and
broadcast licensee. Having acknowledged that state-operated tele-
vision stations are not protected by the first amendment, the court
proceeded to give the stations carte blanche editorial discretion
under statutory and regulatory authority. In effect, "the Court has
elevated 'the Communications Act above the Constitution'"1 by
finding no restrictions on state-operated television other than
those imposed by federal regulation, and by failing to explain why
147. Muir I, 656 F.2d at 1019 n.12.
148. Muir II, 688 F.2d at 1043. Public forums extend a general invitation to anyone
who wishes to use the facility for communication. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. City of West Palm Beach, 457 F.2d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1972). In the context of public
television stations, the Fifth Circuit explained, "[tihe general invitation extended to the
public is not to schedule programs, but to watch or decline to watch what is offered." Muir
III, 688 F.2d at 1042 (footnote omitted).
149. Muir IIi, 688 F.2d at 1043.
150. Id. at 1054 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (quoting Barnstone , 614 F. Supp. at 686).
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these regulations cloak the licensees with immunity from judicial
review.
When evaluating first amendment rights in the electronic age,
one should remember that "[ilt is the right of the viewers and lis-
teners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."15'
On the other hand, a government broadcaster should not have to
justify every programming decision. Any resolution of issues gener-
ated by content regulation of state-owned media must recognize
the evils that could emanate from improper governmental program
selection.
Viewers do not have the right to compel the broadcast of
Death of a Princess or any other program. They do not have the
right to demand that an offering not be aired. And they have no
right to demand guarantees that scheduled selections will always
be broadcast. But they do have the right to feel secure in the
knowledge that "government broadcasters [do not have] more pro-
tection from private citizens than private broadcasters have from
the government.""
JONATHAN GOODMAN
151. Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 368, 390 (1969).
152. Barnstone II, 660 F.2d at 139 (Reavley, J., concurring).
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